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1. Introduction Different	   perspectives	   of	   enhancing	   humans	   have	   raised	   different	   kinds	   of	  issues,	   but	   one	  of	   the	  most	  prominent	   is	   the	  possible	   radical	   increase	  of	   the	  gap	  between	  enhanced	  and	  unenhanced	  persons.	  For	  example	  Geroge	  Annas	  has	   claimed	   that	   if	   we	   were	   to	   succeed	   in	   our	   attempts	   to	   create	   perfect	  humans	  this	  would	  create	  deadly	  consequences:	  since	   the	   ««improved»	   posthumans	   would	   inevitably	   come	   to	  view	   the	   «naturals»	   as	   inferior,	   as	   a	   subspecies	   of	   humans	  suitable	   for	   exploitation,	   slavery,	   or	   even	   extermination.	  Ultimately,	   it	   is	   this	   prospect	   of	   what	   can	   be	   termed	   «genetic	  genocide»	  that	  makes	  cloning	  combined	  with	  genetic	  engineering	  a	   potential	   weapon	   of	   mass	   destruction,	   and	   the	   biologist	   who	  would	  attempt	  it	  a	  potential	  bioterrorist	  (Annas	  2002)2. The	   issue	   is	   not	   new	   and	   has	   been	   raised	   in	   different	   forms	   not	   just	   in	  bioethical	   literature,	  but	   in	  popular	  culture	  as	  well,	   from	  Huxley’s	  Brave	  New	  




racial	   or	   other	   differences	   there	   are.	  However,	   one	  may	   press	   the	   issue	   and	  raise	  the	   following	  question—“What	   if	  as	  a	  result	  of	  enhancement,	   there	  will	  emerge	  beings	  whose	  moral	   status	  would	  be	  higher	   than	   that	  of	  persons?	   Is	  there	  anything	  that	  rules	  out	  this	  possibility?”	  This,	  using	  Buchanan’s	  words,	  is	  a	   “more	   profound	   worry”,	   because	   it	   challenges	   the	   just	   mentioned	  assumption	  of	  moral	  equality	  (Buchanan	  2011,	  209)3. This	   worrying	   possibility	   of	   creating	   post-­‐persons	   (or—as	   some	   call	  them—«supra-­‐persons»)	   has	   recently	   drawn	   the	   attention	   of	   many	  respectable	   bioethicists	   (see:	   Buchanan	   2009,	   McMahan,	   2009,	   Savulescu,	  2009,	   Agar	   2013,	   Douglas	   2013b)4.	   So	   far	   the	   main	   questions	   raised	   about	  post-­‐persons	  have	  been	  the	  two	  following	  ones:	   first,	   is	   the	  possibility	  of	   the	  existence	   of	   post-­‐persons	   conceivable	   at	   all,	   and	   second,	   if	   there	   is	   the	  possibility—however	  distant—to	  create	  such	  beings,	  would	  it	  be	  a	  good	  idea	  to	  have	  them	  around?	  Buchanan	  (2011),	   for	  example,	  argues	  that	   the	   idea	  of	  beings	   with	   moral	   status	   higher	   than	   that	   of	   persons	   is	   implausible.	   Agar	  (2014)5,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   disagrees	   and	   proposes	   an	   argument	   to	   the	  conclusion	  that	  there	  might	  be	  post-­‐persons;	  however,	  he	  argues	  that	  it	  would	  be	  morally	   wrong	   to	   create	   such	   beings.	   In	   what	   follows	   I	   am	   not	   going	   to	  discuss	  the	  second	  question	  at	  all	  and	  I	  shall	  not	  (directly	  at	  least)	  address	  the	  first	   one	   as	   well.	   Instead, I	   shall	   pursue	   the	   slightly	   different	   task	   of	  questioning	  some	  of	   the	  assumptions	  on	  which	  much	  of	   the	  recent	   literature	  on	   human	   cognitive	   enhancement	   relies.	   There	   are	   at	   least	   two	   issues	   with	  Agar’s	   account.	   First,	   he	   dismisses	   the	   importance	   of	   phenomenology	   in	  framing	  our	  ethical	  outlook.	  Second,	  he	  seems	  to	  follow	  the	  assumption	  made	  by	   many	   utilitarian	   ethicists	   that	   certain	   features	   that	   account	   for	   our	  personhood	   have	   some	   universal	   relevance.	   My	   contention	   is	   that	   these	  assumptions	  should	  be	  reconsidered	  if	  we	  want	  to	  get	  a	  more	  realistic	  view	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  cognitive	  enhancement.	  	  I	  proceed	  in	  two	  steps.	   In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  discuss	  Agar’s	  arguments	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  post-­‐persons.	  The	  main	  purpose	  of	  this	  is	  to	  introduce	  the	  conceptual	   framework	   used	   by	   the	   authors	   who	   address	   the	   issue	   and	   to	  illustrate	   the	  main	   conceptual	  obstacles	  when	   talking	  about	  post-­‐persons.	   In	  the	   third	   section	   I	   try	   to	  make	   clear	  what	   I	   think	   is	  wrong	  with	  Agar’s	   (and	  others’)	  overall	  take	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  post-­‐persons.	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  Buchanan	  calls	  it	  “Moral	  Equality	  Assumption”,	  ibid.	  4	   Journal	   of	   Medical	   Ethics	   (2013,	   Vol.	   39)	   featured	   a	   discussion	   on	   the	   biomedical	  enhancement	  of	  moral	  status	  with	  Agar’s	  (2013)	  paper	  as	  Feature	  Article	  and	  replies	  from	  Sparrow,	  Hauskeller,	  Wasserman,	  Persson,	  and	  Douglas.	  5	   Agar	   2014	  Ch.	   8	   and	  9	   are	  more	   elaborated	   versions	   of	  Agar	   2013.	   Further	   in	  my	  discussion	  I	  shall	  refer	  to	  the	  book.	  




2. Agar on Post-Persons Agar	  presents	  his	  position	  by	  engaging	  with	  Buchanan’s	  arguments	  against	  the	  possibility	  of	  post-­‐persons.	  Buchanan	   (2011),	   according	   to	  Agar	   (2014,	  161)	  has	   identified	   three	   different	   obstacles	   that	   make	   the	   idea	   of	   post-­‐persons	  implausible.	  First,	   there	   is	  (1)	  the	  problem	  of	   the	   logic	  of	   thresholds,	  second,	  (2)	   the	   problem	   of	   how	   to	   improve	   upon	   inviolability,	   and,	   third,	   (3)	   the	  problem	  of	   expressing	  moral	   statuses	  higher	   than	  personhood.	   I	   shall	   give	   a	  short	  sketch	  of	  each	  obstacle	  as	  presented	  by	  Buchanan,	  and	  show	  how	  Agar	  tries	   to	   overcome	   them.	   While	   doing	   that	   I	   shall	   make	   some	   comments	   on	  Agar’s	  proposed	  solutions.	  
2.1 The logic of thresholds Although	   the	   terms	   “moral	   status”	   and	   “moral	   standing”	   are	   used	  interchangeably,	   Buchanan	   distinguishes	   them.	   	   In	   his	   account	   a	   being	   has	  moral	  standing	  if	  “it	  counts	  morally,	  in	  its	  own	  right”.	  “Moral	  standing”	  is	  not	  a	  comparative	  notion.	  The	  being	  either	  counts	  morally	  or	  not.	  In	  contrast	  to	  that	  “moral	  status”	  is	  a	  comparative	  notion	  as	  different	  beings	  may	  have	  different	  moral	  statuses,	  i.e.,	  some	  may	  count	  more	  than	  others	  (Buchanan,	  2011,	  209-­‐10).	  According	   to	  Buchanan	   the	  moral	   status	  of	   persons	   is	   such	   that	   it	   rules	  out	   the	   possibility	   of	   having	   it	   in	   greater	   or	   lesser	   degree.	   Or,	   to	   put	   it	   in	  another	   words,	   the	   concept	   of	   moral	   status	   is	   a	   threshold	   and	   not	   a	   scalar	  concept.	  As	  Buchanan	  points	  out:	  	  According	   to	   theories	   that	   accord	   moral	   status	   (or	   the	   highest	  moral	   status)	   to	   persons,	   understood	   as	   beings	   who	   have	   the	  capacity	   for	   practical	   rationality	   or	   for	   engaging	   in	   practices	   of	  mutual	   accountability,	   what	   matters	   is	   whether	   one	   has	   the	  capacity	  in	  question.	  Once	  the	  threshold	  is	  reached,	  how	  well	  one	  reasons	  practically	  or	  how	  well	  one	  engages	  in	  practices	  of	  mutual	  accountability	  does	  not	  affect	  moral	  status	  (2011,	  215). It	   follows	   from	  this	  account	   that	  as	  soon	  as	  a	  creature	   is	  a	  person,	  he	  or	  she	  has	  the	  same	  moral	  status	  as	  any	  other	  person	  whatever	  the	  differences	  there	  are	  between	  these	  persons	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  capacities	  that	  constitute	  their	  personhood.	   It	   is	   like	  having	   a	  driver’s	   licence—as	   soon	  as	   you	  get	   one,	   you	  have	   the	   same	   rights	   as	   any	   other	   licence	   owner	   whether	   or	   not	   they	   are	  worse	  or	  better	  drivers	  than	  you.	  Thus,	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  recognize	  personhood	  as	  moral	  status,	  the	  enhancement	  of	  moral	  status	  is	  ruled	  out.	  Not	  so,	  according	  to	  Agar.	  He	  argues	  that	  moral	  status	  enhancement	  is	  compatible	   with	   the	   view	   that	   the	   moral	   status	   of	   persons	   is	   a	   threshold	  concept	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  moral	  status	  of	  persons	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  weak	  




“point	  or	  region	  behind	  which	  moderate	  improvements	  to	  capacities	  relevant	  to	   moral	   status	   make	   no	   difference	   to	   status.	   Improvements	   of	   greater	  magnitude	   could	   make	   a	   difference	   to	   status.”	   Buchanan’s	   supposed	  impossibility	  of	  moral	   status	   enhancement	   follows	   from	  his	   assumption	   that	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  persons	  is	  a	  strong	  moral	  status	  threshold.	  However,	  if	  we	  posit	  a	  weak	  threshold	  in	  moral	  status,	  then	  Buchanan’s	  obstacle	  seems	  to	  be	  removed.	  	  How	   good	   is	   Agar’s	   move?	   One	   may	   be	   tempted	   to	   see	   it	   just	   as	   a	  stipulation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  threshold,	  because	  it	  seems	  that	  all	  that	  Agar’s	  supposed	   solution	   amounts	   to	   is	   saying	   that	   instead	   of	   Buchanan’s	   strong	  threshold	  there	  is	  a	  weak	  one.	  Whether	  this	  complaint	  is	  justified	  depends	  on	  whether	   there	   is	   something	   in	   Buchanan’s	   conception	   of	   moral	   status	   of	  persons	   that	   precludes	   such	   a	   stipulation.	   However,	   it	   is	   not	   easy	   to	   give	   a	  straightforward	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   as	   it	   involves	   controversial	   issues	  about	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  moral	  status	  itself.	  	  Buchanan	  in	  his	  discussion	  (2011,	  218)	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	   two	   different	   models	   of	   thinking	   about	   moral	   status.	   According	   to	   so-­‐called	  interest-­‐based	  accounts,	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  a	  being	  depends	  upon	  what	  kind	  of	   interests	   it	   has.	  The	  more	   interests	   a	  being	  has,	   the	  higher	   its	  moral	  status.	   This	   view	   implies	   that	   there	   is	   a	   continuum	   of	  moral	   considerability	  without	  sharp	  divisions	  (See	  Figure	  1)6. 
 	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  The	  interest-­‐based	  account	  of	  moral	  status	  implies	  that	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  a	  creature	  is	  
determined	   by	   its	   mental	   capacities.	   Persons	   are	   beings	   whose	   level	   of	   mental	   capacity	   is	  
somewhere	  between	  A	  and	  B.	   It	   is	  obvious	   that	   there	   is	  nothing	   in	   this	  model	   that	  precludes	   the	  
existence	  of	  post-­‐persons.	  Post-­‐persons	  are	  located	  somewhere	  above	  B.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Here	  and	  below	  my	  representation	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  metal	  capacities	  and	  moral	  status	  is	  inspired	  by	  Douglas	  (2013b).	  




Buchanan	  claims	  that	  the	  interest-­‐based	  account	  “seems	  to	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  debunking	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  different	  moral	  statuses”	  and	  that	  makes	  this	  model	  less	   plausible	   than	   the	   so	   called	   respect-­‐based	   model	   which	   stems	   from	  Kantian	  moral	  philosophy.	  According	   to	   this	  account	   “all	  beings	   that	  possess	  certain	   capacities	   have	   an	   intrinsic	  moral	  worth	   that	   in	   some	   sense	   confers	  




Figure	   2:	   According	   to	   the	   respect-­‐based	   model,	   moral	   status	   is	   a	   threshold	   concept.	   No	  
improvement	  in	  mental	  capacities	  can	  enhance	  moral	  status	  as	  soon	  as	  a	  creature	  has	  reached	  a	  




enhancement,	  because	  Buchanan’s	  view	  is	  compatible	  with	  there	  being	  more	  than	  one	  threshold	  (see	  Figure	  3)7. 
 
	  
Figure	   3:	   According	   to	   a	   weak	   moral	   status	   threshold	   moderate	   improvements	   in	   mental	  
capacities	  make	  no	  difference	  to	  moral	  status,	  although	  improvements	  of	  certain	  magnitude	  could	  
enhance	  moral	  status	  beyond	  that	  of	  persons.	  By	   now	   it	   should	   be	   obvious	   that	   Agar	   is	   right	   if	   one	   of	   two	   following	  conditions	  is	  satisfied:	  (1) The	   abilities	   (moral	   or	   non-­‐moral)	   that	   define	   personhood	   are	   not	  threshold	  abilities,	  or	  (2) There	  is/are	  some	  capacity/ies	  not	  related	  to	  personhood	  that	  a	  being	  may	  have,	  which	   enhance/enhances	   its	  moral	   status	  beyond	   that	   of	  mere	  persons.	  
 Agar	  doesn’t	  discuss	  the	  second	  possibility,	  so	  let	  me	  put	  it	  aside	  for	  a	  while	  (we	  will	  return	  to	  this	  issue	  later)	  and	  turn	  to	  the	  first.	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  personhood	  is	  grounded	  in	  some	  capacities	  that	  the	  being	  in	  question	  has,	  and	  if	  those	  capacities	  are	  such	  that	  no	  improvement	  of	  them	  can	  change	  the	  being	   into	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   being,	   then	   these	   abilities	   are	   considered	   as	  threshold	  abilities.	  For	  example,	   if	  we,	  following	  Frankfurt	  (1971),	  would	  say	  that	  a	  being	  is	  a	  person	  if	  it	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  have	  second	  order	  desires	  and	  beliefs,	   then	   it	   seems	   to	   be	   the	   case	   that	   no	  matter	   how	   this	   ability	   can	   be	  improved,	   it	   will	   not	   change	   the	   person	   into	   a	   different	   kind	   of	   being.	   As	   a	  consequence	  the	  capacity	  to	  have	  second	  order	  desires	  and	  beliefs	  should	  be	  considered	   a	   threshold	   ability.	   Can	   we	   say	   the	   same	   about	   Buchanan’s	  proposed	   “capacity	   for	   practical	   rationality	   or	   for	   engaging	   in	   practices	   of	  mutual	   accountability”	   as	   the	  main	   characteristic	   of	  personhood?	  This	   is	   too	  complicated	   an	   issue	   to	   be	   addressed	   here.	   It	   seems	   that	   the	  main	   intuition	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Douglas	  (2013n)	  argues	  for	  the	  same	  conclusion.	  




behind	  Buchanan’s	  view	  that	  moral	  status	  is	  threshold	  concept	  is	  that	  capacity	  for	  practical	  rationality	  is	  also	  a	  threshold	  capacity,	  but	  whether	  this	  is	  really	  the	  case	  is	  a	  matter	  for	  a	  separate	  discussion.	  At	   this	   point	   we	   can	   conclude	   that	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   logic	   of	  thresholds	  is	  too	  complicated	  to	  be	  solved	  by	  merely	  stipulating	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  threshold.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   if	  we	  take	  into	  account	  the	  two	  conditions	  that	  are	  mentioned	  above,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  admitted	  that	  Buchanan’s	  account	  still	  leaves	  some	  room	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  moral-­‐status	  enhancement.	  
2.2 Inviolability The	  problem	  of	  how	   to	   improve	  upon	   inviolability	   is	   somewhat	   similar	   (and	  related)	   to	   the	  problem	  of	   the	   logic	   of	   thresholds.	   It	   has	   already	  been	  noted	  that	   according	   to	   the	   respect-­‐based	  model,	   persons	   have	   an	   “intrinsic	  moral	  worth	  that	  in	  some	  sense	  confers	  inviolability.”	  This	  in	  turn	  implies	  that	  beings	  with	   higher	  moral	   status	   than	  mere	   persons	   deserve	  more	   respect	   than	  we	  owe	   to	   persons.	   But	   we	   have	   a	   problem—if	   persons	   already	   are	   inviolable,	  then	  what	  higher	   level	   of	   inviolability	   can	  be	   ascribed	   to	  post-­‐persons?	  This	  problem—as	   in	   the	   previous	   case—is	   created	   by	   treating	   inviolability	   as	   a	  threshold	   concept8.	   To	   avoid	   the	   problem,	   Agar	   (2014,	   163-­‐164)	   follows	  McMahan	   (2009),	   who	   proposes	   to	   reject	   an	   absolutist	   reading	   of	  inviolability—a	  view	  according	   to	  which	  under	  no	   circumstances	   it	   could	  be	  right	   to	   sacrifice	   an	   inviolable	   being.	   McMahan	   appeals	   to	   a	   commonsense	  view	  that	  in	  some	  extreme	  cases	  it	  is	  justified	  to	  kill	  an	  innocent	  person	  as	  the	  only	  way	  to	  prevent	  the	  killing	  of	  a	  very	  large	  number	  of	  other	  innocents.	  This	  in	  turn	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  no	  absolute	  prohibition	  of	  sacrificing	  persons	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  violability	  and	   inviolability	  comes	   in	  degrees.	  And	   if	   this	   is	  right,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  problem	  with	  the	  view	  that	  post-­‐persons	  are	  relatively	  more	  inviolable	  than	  mere	  persons.	  	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  things	  that	  can	  be	  said	  about	  Agar’s	  strategy	  of	  avoiding	  the	  problem	  of	  inviolability.	  First,	  it	  seems	  that	  similarly	  as	  in	  dealing	  with	   the	  problem	  of	   thresholds,	  Agar	  again	  oscillates	  between	  respect-­‐based	  and	  interest-­‐based	  models	  of	  moral	  status.	  But	  even	  if	  we	  grant	  this,	   there	   is	  another,	   second,	   problem	   with	   the	   argument—it	   is	   invalid.	   From	   the	  observation	   that	   in	   some	   emergency	   cases	   it	   is	   justified	   to	   sacrifice	   an	  innocent	  person,	  it	  just	  doesn’t	  follow	  that	  inviolability	  comes	  in	  degrees9. 




do	  it	  we	  find	  it	  impossible.	  Buchanan	  in	  this	  failure	  sees	  a	  reason	  to	  doubt	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  very	  concept	  (2011,	  217).	  He	  claims	  that:	  From	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   respect-­‐based	   view,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	  imagine	   what	   a	   higher	   threshold—one	   that	   required	   a	   higher	  moral	   status—would	   be	   like.	   It	   does	   not	   seem	   plausible	   to	   say	  that	   it	   would	   consist	   simply	   of	   higher	   levels	   of	   the	   same	  characteristics	   that	   now	   constitute	   the	   threshold	   the	   respect	  based	   view	   employs.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   account	   of	   what	   the	  higher	   threshold	   would	   be	   like,	   the	   claim	   that	   there	   could	   be	  beings	   at	   a	   higher	   threshold	   who	   would	   have	   a	   higher	   moral	  status	  is	  not	  convincing	  (2011,	  220). At	   the	   same	   time	   Buchanan	   admits	   that	   the	   impossibility	   to	   imagine	   higher	  moral	   status	   by	   itself	   doesn’t	   solve	   the	   issue,	   as	   failure	   of	   imagination	   and	  conceptual	  incoherence	  are	  two	  different	  things	  (2011,	  217).	  But	  still,	  he	  asks:	  “How	   can	   we	   explore	   the	   moral	   implications	   of	   what	   we	   cannot	   imagine?”	  Now	  it	  seems	  that	  all	  hangs	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  describe	  higher	  moral	  statuses.	   Buchanan	   correctly	   points	   out	   that	   the	   strategy	   to	   augment	   the	  capacities	   that	   account	   for	   personhood	   is	   a	   non-­‐starter,	   because	   instead	   of	  post-­‐persons	  we	  will	  get	  perfected	  mere	  persons.	  Agar	  (2014,	  158-­‐159)	  draws	  a	  useful	  distinction	  between	  moral	  disposition	  enhancement	   and	  moral	   status	  
enhancement.	   The	   aim	   of	   moral	   disposition	   enhancement	   is	   to	   increase	   the	  moral	   value	   of	   an	   agent’s	   character,	   e.g.,	   to	   improve	   his	   or	   her	   abilities	   to	  empathize,	   resist	   different	  biases	   etc.	  The	   aim	  of	  moral	   status	   enhancement,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  degree	  of	  respect	  that	  is	  owed	  to	  a	  being.	  To	  try	  to	  explain	  higher	  moral	  statuses	  by	  reference	  to	  more	  enhanced	  moral	  characteristics	   is	   to	   commit	   the	   common	  mistake	   of	   confusing	  moral	   status	  enhancement	   with	   moral	   disposition	   enhancement10.	   Is	   there	   any	   other	  strategy	  that	  would	  avoid	  this	  fallacy?	  Agar	  thinks	  that	  there	  is,	  but	  before	  we	  go	   to	   the	   solution	   it	   is	   important	   to	   get	   clear	  what,	   according	   to	  Agar,	   is	   the	  main	  source	  of	  the	  problem.	  He	  speculates	  (2014,	  175)	  that	  the	  reason	  we	  cannot	  grasp	  the	  criteria	  for	   post-­‐personhood	   is	   because	   they	   are	   constituted	   by	   abilities	   that	   are	  cognitive:	  “The	  fact	  that	  criteria	  for	  post-­‐personhood	  are	  cognitive	  is	  a	  barrier	  to	  mere	  person’s	  powers	  of	  expression	  and	  imagination.”	  The	  assumption	  here	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  we	  must	  think	  about	  our	  relation	  to	  personhood	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  we	  imagine,	  say,	  a	  dog’s	  relation	  to	  a	  human	  person.	  As	  the	  criteria	  for	  personhood	   are	   constituted	   by	   the	   abilities	   that	   are	   cognitive,	   the	   dog	   is	   as	  clueless	   about	   persons	   as	  we	   are	   about	   post-­‐persons.	   And	   it	   is	   obvious	   that	  from	  the	  dog’s	  cluelesness	  about	  persons	  it	  doesn’t	   follow	  that	  persons	  don’t	  exist.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	   Agar	   (2014,	   167-­‐174)	   criticizes	   DeGrazia	   (2012),	   McMahan	   (2009)	   and	   Douglas	  (2013b)	   for	   too	   much	   relying	   on	   the	   link	   between	   disposition	   and	   moral	   status	  enhancement.	  




So	  the	  question	  now	  is—how	  to	  overcome	  our	  cognitive	  barrier?	  Agar	  rather	  ingeniously	  suggests	  that	  this	  limitation	  can	  be	  overcome	  by	  deferring	  to	  beings	  who	  are	  able	  to	  grasp	  the	  criteria	  for	  post-­‐personhood.	  This	  should	  be	  viewed	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  as	  our	  deference	  to	  other	  people	  whose	  skills	  and	  imaginative	   powers	   exceed	   our	   own.	   If	   we	   believe	   in	   the	   sincerity	   and	  expertise	  of	  physicist	  or	  mathematician,	  then	  we	  rely	  on	  what	  they	  say	  to	  us,	  even	   if	   sometimes	   we	   find	   it	   hard	   to	   grasp	   properly.	   Provided	   that	   post-­‐persons	  would	   lack	  our	  cognitive	   limitations,	   they	  would	  be	  able	   to	  know	  all	  morally	   relevant	   facts	   known	   by	   persons	   and	   also	   those	   that	   persons	   are	  ignorant	  about.	  	  Thus	   Agar	   has	   prepared	   the	   ground	   for	  what	   he	   calls	   a	   “moderately	  strong	  inductive	  argument”	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  criteria	  for	  post-­‐personhood.	  




expertise	   from	   the	  point	  of	   view	  of	   a	  particular	   set	  of	   values,	   then	   it	  doesn’t	  look	   like	   an	   ability	   that	   can	  be	   always	   improved.	  Of	   course,	   things	   get	  more	  complicated	   as	   soon	   as	   we	   widen	   the	   area	   about	   which	   we	   have	   to	   make	  decisions.	  Compare	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  physician	  has	  to	  administer	  certain	  drug	   to	   a	   patient	   with	   a	   certain	   well	   studied	   condition,	   with	   a	   situation	   in	  which	  I	  have	  to	  decide	  whether	  to	  move	  to	  city	  X	  or	  to	  city	  Y.	  The	  latter	  case	  is	  more	  complicated	  because	  more	  values	  are	  involved	  and	  a	  smaller	  number	  of	  relevant	  facts	  is	  available.	  However,	  it	   is	  far	  from	  clear	  whether	  the	  ability	  to	  know	  all	  the	  relevant	  facts	  and	  greater	  clarity	  about	  values	  would	  necessarily	  make	  me	   a	   better	   practical	   reasoner,	   although	   no	   doubt	   I	   would	   be	   able	   to	  make	  better	  decisions.	  Next,	  after	  a	  closer	   look	  the	  argument	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  moderately	  strong.	   Agar	   claims	   that	   the	   existence	   of	   moral	   status	   category	   (4)	   can	   be	  extrapolated	   from	  three	  observed	  moral	  statuses.	  However,	   if	  we	   look	  closer	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  moral	  status	  categories	  are	  related,	  this	  claim	  seems	  unjustified.	  Sentient	  non-­‐persons	  have	  higher	  moral	  status	  than	  rocks	  due	  to	  their	   sentience.	  However,	  persons	  supposedly	  have	  higher	  moral	   status	   than	  sentient-­‐non	   persons	   not	   because	   they	   have	   more	   of	   what	   sentient	   non-­‐persons	  have,	  but	  due	   to	   capacities	  of	   completely	  different	  kind,	   such	  as	   the	  ability	  to	  engage	  in	  practices	  of	  mutual	  accountability	  or	  the	  capacity	  to	  have	  second	   order	   desires	   and	   beliefs,	   etc.	   Now	   the	   conclusion	   that	   post-­‐persons	  have	   higher	   moral	   status	   because	   they	   have	   more	   of	   something	   that	  constitutes	   personhood	   does	   not	   seem	   very	   well	   supported	   (cf.	   Hauskeller	  2013,	   76).	   In	   fact,	   from	   this	   point	   of	   view	   the	   argument	   rather	   supports	   the	  conclusion	   that	   post-­‐persons	   have	   higher	   moral	   status	   in	   virtue	   of	   having	  some	   completely	  new	  kind	  of	   ability	   that	  mere	  persons	   lack	   (cf.	  Wasserman	  2013,	  79).	  As	  a	  consequence	  I	  find	  Agar’s	  argument	  unconvincing.	  No	  doubt,	  one	  is	  still	  free	  to	  claim	  that	  in	  spite	  of	  all	  the	  possible	  flaws	  of	  Agar’s	  account,	  the	  possibility	  of	  moral	  status	  enhancement	  still	  cannot	  be	  ruled	  out.	  This	  is	  true,	  but	  this	  possibility	  looks	  less	  interesting	  now.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  will	  try	  to	  give	  some	  additional	  reasons	  why	  this	  should	  be	  so.	  	  
3. What Can We Learn from Post-Persons? In	   the	   previous	   section	   I	  mainly	   explored	   Agar’s	  well-­‐argued	   account	   of	   the	  possibility	  of	  moral	  status	  enhancement	  and	  just	  occasionally	  commented	  on	  some	  possible	  problems	  with	  some	  of	  the	  steps	  in	  his	  reasoning.	  But	  there	  are	  larger	   issues	   that	   can	  be	   raised	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  overall	   framework	  of	   the	  present	  discussion.	  I	  presume	  that	  some	  conclusions	  drawn	  by	  Agar	  may	  seem	  rather	   strange	   to	   many	   people.	   My	   contention	   is	   that	   this	   strangeness	   is	   a	  consequence	   of	   some	   basic	   and	   implausible	   assumptions	  made	   by	   Agar	   and	  some	  other	  authors.	  




3.1 Expressibility again Let	  us	  return	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  expressibility,	  as	  I	  believe	  this	  will	  help	  us	  to	  see	   one	   problematic	   feature	   of	   Agar’s	   account.	   Agar	   defends	   the	   view	   that	  there	   are	   higher	  moral	   statuses	   than	   those	   that	   we	   ascribe	   to	   persons	   (see	  Figure	  3).	  But	   remember	   that	  due	   to	  our	   lack	  of	   cognitive	  power	  we	  are	  not	  able	  to	  grasp	  moral	  statuses	  higher	  than	  ours.	  In	  other	  words,	  Figure	  3	  shows	  us	  the	  situation	  as	  it	  appears	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  post-­‐persons.	  From	  our	  perspective,	  things	  look	  rather	  as	  they	  are	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  4. 
 	  
	  
Figure	  4:	  Higher	  moral	  statuses	  as	  they	  are	  seen	  from	  our	  limited	  perspective.	  The	  line	  AB	  depicts	  




to	   post-­‐persons.	   We	   are	   asked	   to	   defer	   to	   the	   view	   of	   sincere,	   cognitively	  superior	   beings;	   however,	   it	   is	   far	   from	   clear	   how	   we	   would	   be	   able	   to	  recognize	  them.	  	  The	   main	   problem	   here	   seems	   to	   be	   that	   Agar	   works	   under	   the	  assumption	   that	   in	  some	  relevant	   respect	   there	   is	  no	  big	  difference	  between	  the	   scientific	   and	   the	   ethical;	   and	   as	   a	   consequence	   he	   dismisses	   the	   role	   of	  phenomenology	  in	  shaping	  our	  ethical	  attitudes.11Agar	  describes	  post-­‐persons	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  physical	  substance	  that	  can	  be	  discovered	  by	  us,	  provided	  that	  we	  use	  the	  proper	  tools:	  Moral	   statuses	   higher	   than	   personhood	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	  analogous	   to	   objects	   including	   space-­‐time	   singularities	   whose	  existence	  we	  can	  infer	  without	  our	  being	  able	  to	  directly	  observe	  them	  (2014,	  158). Described	   in	   such	   a	   way,	   post-­‐persons	   seem	   like	   Epicurean	   gods.	   They	   are	  great,	  but	  hardly	  make	  any	  moral	  or	  any	  other	  difference	  for	  us.	  
3.2 Morally sensitive Martians  Another	   characteristic	   feature	   of	   Agar’s	   (and	   not	   only	   his)	   account	   is	   a	  noticeable	  lack	  of	  human	  perspective.	  Instead	  of	  this	  we	  are	  offered	  a	  view	  on	  things	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  universe	  (cf.	  Willliams	  2006).	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  brilliant	  paper	  “Human	  enhancement	  and	  supra-­‐personal	  moral	  status”	  T.	  Douglass	  makes	   the	   following	   comment	  about	  Buchanan’s	   claim	  on	  moral	  status	  of	  persons	  as	  a	  threshold	  concept:	  It	   would	   be	   a	   surprising	   good	   fortune	   for	   humanity	   if	   the	  threshold	   form	  maximum	  moral	  status	   lay	   just	  below	  the	   level	  of	  mental	  capacity	  typical	  of	  ordinary	  adult	  humans	  (2013b,	  481). Douglas	  implies	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  case	  that	  moral	  statuses	  somehow	  exist	  out	   there	   for	   anybody	   to	   discover,	   but	   that	   they	   have	   the	   same	   moral	  importance	  across	  the	  entire	  Universe.	   In	  a	  rather	  similar	  manner,	  Savulescu	  (2009,	  235)	  with	  approval	  quotes	  McMahan	  (2002,	  227),	  who	  claims	  that:	  We	  owe	  to	  them	  [animals]	  whatever	  kind	  of	  treatment	  we	  believe	  the	   severely	   retarded	  would	   be	   owed	   in	   virtue	   of	   their	   intrinsic	  natures	  by	  morally	  sensitive	  Martians	  (emphasis	  added). We	  may	  of	  course	  wonder	  why	  those	  morally	  sensitive	  Martians	  sound	  quite	  similar	   to	   Peter	   Singer,	   McMahan	   himself	   or	   some	   other	   utilitarians.	   In	   a	  rather	   Humean	   fashion	   we	   may	   ask	   which	   of	   the	   two	   hypotheses	   has	   the	  higher	  probability	  of	  being	  true:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	   In	   his	   argument	   Agar	   constantly	   takes	   moral	   reasoning	   to	   be	   similar	   to	  mathematical	   reasoning	  (see	  2014,	  177,	  178).	  The	   issue	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	  science	  and	  ethics	  is	  too	  large	  to	  address	  here.	  The	  account	  I	  find	  myself	  in	  agreement	  with	  is	  that	  of	  Williams	  (1985,	  Ch.	  8).	  




1) McMahan	   and	   others	   have	   discovered	   some	   moral	   features	   that	   are	  relevant	  even	  to	  Martians;	  2) McMahan’s	   view	   that	   sentience	   and	   personhood	   matter	   even	   to	  Martians	   can	   be	   explained	   in	   some	   other	  way,	   for	   example	   as	   a	   bias	  toward	  features	  that	  we	  humans	  find	  morally	  important.	  
 If	   matters	   are	   viewed	   in	   this	   way,	   then	   the	   second	   hypothesis	   seems	   more	  probable	  than	  the	  first.	  I	  would	  speculate	  that	  this	  sort	  of	  bias	  is	  at	  work	  when	  we	   tend	   to	   imagine	   animals	   as	   a	   sort	   of	   handicapped	   humans	   (notice,	   that	  McMahan’s	   sensitive	   Martians	   don’t	   see	   the	   difference)	   or	   when	   we	   try	   to	  imagine	   post-­‐persons	   as	   surpassing	   us	   by	   having	   the	   same	   capacities	   that	  makes	  us	  persons	  but	  just	  in	  considerably	  higher	  degree.	  Of	  course,	  we	  cannot	  be	   sure	   that	   this	   is	   wrong.	   It	   is	   just	   highly	   improbable.	   This	   observation	  implies	   a	   sort	   of	   irony	   because	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	   features	   of	  utilitarian	   ethics	   according	   to	   its	   proponents	   is	   the	   ability	   to	   overcome	   our	  biased	  human	  outlook	  and	  enable	  as	  to	  widen	  our	  moral	  circle.	  Now	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  human	  bias	  at	  the	  very	  roots	  of	  the	  utilitarian	  outlook.	  
4. Conclusion In	  spite	  of	   the	  objections	  that	  one	  can	  raise	  against	  Agar’s	  arguments	   for	  the	  possibility	  of	  moral	  status	  enhancement,	  there	  are	  no	  conclusive	  reasons	  that	  would	  rule	  out	  the	  existence	  of	  post-­‐persons.	  However,	  if	  post-­‐persons	  are	  as	  they	  are	  described	  in	  Agar’s	  account,	  their	  possible	  existence	  seems	  to	  be	  less	  interesting	  than	  one	  might	  think.	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  reasons	  for	  this.	  First,	  Agar	   ignores	   the	   importance	   of	   phenomenology	   in	   shaping	   our	   moral	  attitudes.	   Secondly,	   his	   account	   seems	   to	   be	   biased	   as	   it	   ascribes	   universal	  importance	  to	  the	  features	  that	  we	  as	  humans	  happen	  to	  find	  morally	  relevant	  from	  our	   local	  human	  perspective.	  Thus	  by	  constructing	  the	  account	  of	  post-­‐persons	  we	  don’t	  correct	  our	  ethical	  myopia,	  but	  rather	  express	  it.	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Abstract.	  Many	   prominent	   bioethicists	   have	   recently	   raised	   the	   question	   of	  the	   possibility	   of	   moral	   status	   enhancement.	   In	   this	   paper	   I	   discuss	   the	  arguments	  advanced	  by	  Nicholas	  Agar	   for	   the	  possible	  existence	  of	   the	  post-­‐persons.	   I	   argue	   that	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   many	   limitations	   and	   shortcomings	   of	  Agar’s	   account,	   there	  are	  no	   conclusive	   reasons	   to	   rule	  out	   the	  possibility	  of	  moral	  status	  enhancement.	  However,	  if	  post-­‐persons	  are	  as	  they	  are	  described	  by	  Agar,	   the	   fact	   of	   their	   possibility	   is	   less	   interesting	   and	   ethically	   relevant	  than	   it	  might	   seem.	  Most	   importantly,	   the	   account	   of	   post-­‐persons	   given	   by	  Agar	   is	   rather	   an	   outcome	   of	   some	   implausible	   assumptions.	   I	   propose	   that	  Agar	  conflates	  the	  ethical	  with	  the	  scientific	  and	  dismisses	  the	  importance	  of	  phenomenology	   in	   framing	   our	   ethical	   outlook.	   Also,	   he	   seems	   to	   follow	   the	  assumption	  made	  by	  many	  utilitarian	  ethicists	  that	  such	  features	  as	  sentience	  and	  cognitive	  capacities	  have	  some	  universal	  relevance.	  This	  accounts	  for	  the	  delusion	   that	  we	  can	  view	  our	  moral	   attitudes	   from	   the	  point	  of	   view	  of	   the	  Universe.	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